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The recent release of the full text of Major-General CM. Maltby's Official Dispatch 
as the General Officer Commanding at Hong 
Kong (Public Record Office WO 106/240113) 
prompted British and Canadian newspapers to 
run sensational stories quoting Maltby's 
criticisms of the discipline and battlefield 
performance of the Canadian battalions. 
Maltby's statements, which were censored when 
the Dispatch was initially released, require a 
detailed examination and will be discussed in 
a future issue of CMH. In addition, the Spring 
1994 issue will carry an article by Paul Dickson 
on "Crerar and the Decision to Garrison Hong 
Kong." For the present we are publishing an 
exchange of correspondence, dated January 
1948, between Lieutenant-Colonel G.W.L. 
Nicholson, then Deputy Director of the Army 
Historical Section, and Brigadier John H. Price 
who was second-in-command of the Royal 
Rifles of Canada in Hong Kong. Brigadier Price 
was asked to comment, not on the censored 
Dispatch, but on extracts from a draft report 
prepared by the Historical Section of the British 
Cabinet Office. This report contained the 
substance of the most serious charges Maltby 
made about the conduct of the Royal Rifles. 
For the information of the reader, other officers 
mentioned in the exchange include Brigadier 
C. Wallis, Indian Army, commander of the East 
Brigade (to which the Royal Rifles belonged), 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.J. Home, commander of 
the Royal Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel J.L.R. 
Sutcliffe, Commanding Officer, Winnipeg 
Grenad ie r s , Brigadier J.K. Lawson, 
Commanding Officer, "C" Force (as the 
Canadian contingent was known) and Colonel 
P. Hennessy, Lawson's second-in-command. 
Mqjor-General CM. Maltby and Brigadier J.K. Lawson 
111 
1
Nicholson and Price: Maltby’s Hong Kong Dispatch
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993
HQC 5393-13 (DDHS) 
13 January 1948 
Brigadier J.H. Price, M.C., E.D., 
249 Laurier Ave., 
Quebec City, P.Q. 
Dear Brigadier Price, 
You will remember that I called on you towards the end of March 1946, when I was 
visiting Headquarters M.D.5 for the purpose of interviewing various surviving officers of 
"C" Force. 
You will probably recall on that occasion that you suggested the desirability of my 
seeing Major General Maltby and Brigadier Wallis. You had gained an impression, during 
your internment with these officers on Formosa, that they were of the opinion that during 
the last days of the seige the Officer Commanding the Royal Rifles had put forward 
proposals for the withdrawal of Canadian troops from operations. 
I subsequently interviewed General Maltby and Brigadier Wallis in London, and was 
given an opportunity of reading the former's official Dispatch on the Hong Kong 
Operations, and the latter's War Diaries of the Mainland and East Island Brigades. From 
their conversations and from material recorded in these documents it was evident to me 
that you were correct in your assumption. 
The Historical Section A. H. Q. has now received a draft report dealing with the War with 
Japan prepared by the Historical Section, Cabinet Office, London. The report contains 
certain passages describing incidents concerning the participation of Canadian troops in 
the defence of Hong Kong which have not appeared in Canadian sources seen by this 
Directorate. In view of our previous conversation on this matter, I am taking the liberty 
of forwarding to you a copy of extracts from this report for your comments. 
From the point of view of historical accuracy, we are naturally anxious to arrive at the 
true facts of the case. Brigadier Home has not been approached on the matter, which it 
was felt, might be a source of embarrassment to him. It was considered that as you are 
in the position of having been a close observer of the events which took place and yet were 
not personally involved in the controversial matters under consideration, your assistance 
would be most valuable. 
Yours sincerely, 
sgd G.W.L. Nicholson 
(G.W.L. Nicholson) Lt-Col, 
Deputy Director, 
Historical Section (G.S.). 
Encl. 
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Extracts from the Report of the Historical 
Section, Cabinet Office, London 
"21 Dec. At 2200 hours at Stone Hill headquarters Lieut.-Colonel Home informed 
Brigadier Wallis that he wished to see the Governor: his battalion was exhausted; further 
resistance would only result in the wastage of valuable Canadian lives; as senior 
Canadian officer he felt a grave responsibility. This unprecedented request came as a 
great shock to the brigadier who pointed out that the G.O.C. could not be ignored in such 
a fashion. Eventually Colonel Home was persuaded to await what counsel a night's sleep 
might bring and Brigadier Wallis reported the matter to General Maltby by telephone. 
The attitude of Lieut.-Colonel Home, who had consulted Lieut.-Colonel Sutcliffe of 
the Winnipeg Grenadiers, is not to be regarded as that of an ordinary battalion 
commander. He was, indeed, the senior surviving Canadian officer and as such felt 
himself answerable to the Canadian Chief of the General Staff, to the Dominion 
Government, to the Canadian oeonle." 
22 Dec. "At 1030 hours the brigadier (Wallis) 
conferred over the telephone with General 
Maltby, after reporting that Lieut.-Colonel 
Home's attitude had not changed: he was 
more than ever convinced of the futility of 
continued resistance." 
23 Dec. "At night Brigadier Wallis telephoned 
to Fortress Command a request from Colonel 
Home to speak both to General Maltby and 
to Sir Mark Young. The C a n a d i a n 
commander had again urged that his men 
were unfit to continue the struggle which 
had become a useless waste of lives, and the 
arguments and persuasions of the brigadier 
had no effect: all he required was an 
a s su rance tha t the Canadians would 
continue to resist. 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.J. Home 
(NAC PA 116459) 
113 
3
Nicholson and Price: Maltby’s Hong Kong Dispatch
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993
In the early morning of the 24th Brigadier Wallis held a discussion with Colonel Home 
and the senior officers of the Royal Rifles of Canada who were all firmly convinced that 
their men could do no more. For five days and nights the Royal Rifles, the only infantry 
battalion remaining under Brigadier Wallis' command, had borne the brunt of the attack 
and counter-attack; they had had little opportunity to rest and for long intervals had gone 
without food. Untrained, they had bought their knowledge at a heavy price, their 
hardships and casualties being the greater for their total lack of battle experience. 
Discussions over the telephone between the brigadier and General Maltby followed. 
Eventually it was understood that the Canadians would be withdrawn into reserve at 
Stanley Fort, but that the defence of the Stanley Peninsula would continue." 
Sai Wan Militanj Cemetery, Hong Kong. 
(Commonwealth War Graves Commission Photo PMR 93-326-1) 
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January 27, 1948 
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
Lt.Col. G.W.L. Nicholson 
Deputy Director 
Historical Section (G.S.) 
Depar tment of National Defence 
Ottawa, Ontario 
Dear Col. Nicholson: 
I m u s t apologize for not having answered your letter of the 13th of J a n u a r y , #HQC 5393-
13 (DDHS). I have been away and also I wanted to take some time to consider the copy 
of extracts from the report of the Historical Section, Cabinet Office, London. 
This account is writ ten is such a manne r as to create a wrong impression as to in tent and 
motive. 
There were plenty of Canadian officers who had batt le experience in the first war and who 
were competent to judge as to the possibility of a successful outcome of the defence of the 
island. Consider the facts - The Island had been split in two by vastly superior J a p a n e s e 
forces. On the eas tern brigade front, which included the Stanley Peninsula, the Royal 
Rifles and one company of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force were the only troops 
who had fought cont inuously day and night, without rest, since the landing on the 17th 
and were still carrying all the fighting. By the 21s t they had been greatly reduced in 
fighting s t rength and by the 23rd to a s t rength of a round 500 all r anks . (It might be 
interest ing to note t ha t when troops in this sector were marched out of Stanley fort as 
Prisoners of War, they numbered over 2000). 
The enemy controlled the sea and the air. 3" Mortar ammuni t ion had r u n out. Only one 
bat tery of 18 pdr. g u n s were available for artillery support . Only L.M.G.'s and rifles were 
left to fight with. 
The m e n had been fighting without m u c h food and practically no sleep and were dead 
tired. They were obviously in no condition to p u t up a spirited defence wi thout some rest . 
A reques t t h a t they be given 24 hour s rest was a reasonable one part icularly as it was 
judged tha t there were ample troops available who had participated up to date only to a 
comparatively small degree in the batt le and also as the plan then was to contract the front 
held by a re t i rement to the Stanley Peninsula itself. 
This is par t of the story. 
The other par t cas ts a reflection on Brig. Home and senior Canadian officers which I 
greatly resent and about which I protested to General Maltby when I was with h im at 
Argyle St. Officers P.O.W. Camp, Kowloon, in 1942-1943. 
In my opinion Brig. Wallis' report is not to be relied upon. He was then in s u c h a s ta te 
of great nervous excitement and I believe his menta l s ta te was such tha t he was incapable 
of collected judgement or of efficient leadership. The ins inuat ion in his report is tha t Brig. 
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Home suggested a complete and final withdrawal of the Canadian force from the fighting. 
This is untrue and I so told General Maltby. 
What happened was this. It was known definitely by December 21st that Brig. Lawson 
and Col. Hennessy had been killed and that consequently, Brig. Home became the senior 
Canadian officer in the Colony. As such he inherited responsibilities which he took 
very seriously and which caused him great anxiety. 
It required no great military genius to predict the outcome of the battle once the 
Japanese had landed on the island with their control of sea and air and great 
superiority in weapons and men. He felt, I think rightly, that he would be derelict in 
his duty to his men and to the Canadian Government if he did not communicate his 
conclusions to the highest authority. Also neither Brig. Home nor his officers had any 
faith in Brig. Wallis' judgement or in his conduct of operations. And who had better 
right than he had? He and his men were bearing the brunt of the fighting and knew 
from first hand knowledge the strength and armament of the forces against them. The 
Higher Command had consistently shown an inability to grasp the realities of the 
situation and to pursue tactics which might have prolonged the struggle but could not 
have altered the final result. 
At the meeting on the morning of the 24th, reported by Brig. Wallis, the question of 
capitulation of the Colony was discussed but never was any suggestion made of a 
separate final withdrawal of the Canadian forces. 
It was after this meeting that the Royal Rifles were withdrawn and came into action 
again on Christmas day after some six hours rest only. 
Generally speaking, there are certain inaccuracies which should be corrected:-
1) Brig. Home on the 21st was called by Lt. Col. Sutcliffe who informed him that he 
had received and answered a cable from the Minister of National Defence and also that 
Brig. Lawson and Col. Hennessy had been killed. Lt. Col. Sutcliffe reported that his 
battalion had been terribly decimated and also that he had had some argument with 
Higher Command about useless attacks which his regiment was ordered to make. He 
asked Brig. Home if he could not do something to stop what he considered was a 
useless waste of lives. 
2) I cannot believe that Brig. Home asked Brig. Wallis to see the Governor. This does 
not make sense as we were cut off from the other sector and there was no practical 
way of carrying this out. 
3) So far as I can remember, Brig. Home and I were the only two Canadian officers 
present at the meeting with Brig. Wallis on the 24th. 
If there are any further details you think might serve to clarify the situation, I will be 
glad to let you have them if I can furnish the information. 
Sincerely yours, 
sgd John H. Price 
116 
6
Canadian Military History, Vol. 2 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 15
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol2/iss2/15
